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This paper examines bond and stock market volatility reactions in the euro area and the US following their 
respective economies’ monetary policy decisions, over a uniform sample period (April 1999 to May 2006). For this 
purpose, intraday data on the US and euro area bond and stock markets are used. A strong upsurge in intraday 
volatility at the time of the release of the monetary policy decisions by the two central banks is found, which is more 
pronounced for the US financial markets following Fed monetary policy decisions. Part of the increase in intraday 
volatility in the two economies surrounding monetary policy decisions can be explained by both news of the level of 
monetary policy and revisions in the expected future monetary policy path. The observed strong discrepancy 
between asset price reactions in the US and in the euro area following monetary policy decisions still remains a 
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puzzle, although some tentative explanations are provided in the paper.
Keywords: Monetary policy, intraday dataNon-technical summary 
Volatility of prices of financial assets such as stocks and bonds surrounding monetary policy 
decisions can be used to gauge the extent to which they contain “new news” for market 
participants that would lead them to revise their expectations about the future monetary policy 
path and/or the macroeconomic outlook. If a monetary policy decision causes market participants 
to revise their expectations, this should then be reflected in higher volatility of financial market 
prices compared with a period free of such an event.  
This paper tries to shed some light on the link between monetary policy decisions and asset price 
reactions. Using long time series of intraday data, US and euro area bond and stock market 
intraday volatility patterns surrounding monetary policy decisions by the two central banks are 
derived. Overall both the ECB and the Fed decisions induce an upsurge in intraday volatility on 
their respective bond and stock markets. The reaction on US financial markets following the 
Fed’s decisions are more pronounced compared with the reaction the ECB exerts on the German 
bond markets and the euro area stock markets. The observed strong discrepancy between asset 
price reactions in the US and in the euro area following monetary policy decisions still remains a 
puzzle, although some tentative explanations are provided in the paper. 
When decomposing the asset price reaction based on whether monetary policy rates have been 
altered or not, the level of intraday volatility of the German bond markets and the euro area stock 
markets is found to be higher when interest rates are changed. This can probably be linked to two 
factors. First, monetary policy surprises are on average of a larger magnitude when the ECB 
decides to change rates compared with meetings which resulted in no change. Second, there is a 
non-linear asset volatility price sensitivity – which is particularly pronounced for the German 
bond markets - in that bond markets react significantly stronger to a given target surprise by the 
ECB when there has been a change in the official rate compared with periods when the policy 
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How do financial markets react to the release of monetary policy decisions? The answer to this 
question is of fundamental interest to monetary policymakers, as it provides them with 
information as to first, how well decisions are anticipated by market participants, and second, 
how these agents adjust their views about future monetary policy, output growth and inflation in 
response to a given decision. Such information enables a central bank to judge the immediate 
“success” of any decision taken, i.e. whether market participants reacted in accordance with the 
policymakers’ intentions.  
The purpose of this paper is to assess bond and stock market reactions in the euro area and the 
US following monetary policy decisions by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Federal 
Reserve over a uniform sample period (April 1999 to May 2006). Intraday data are used, and the 
asset price reaction is measured in terms of derived realised volatility measures over five-minute 
intervals. Two different angles are viewed. First, asset price volatility on monetary policy 
announcement days is compared to the volatility observed on non-announcement days. Second, 
the volatility pattern when the central bank changes policy rates as opposed to when the 
monetary policy rates are left unchanged is examined. Conditional on these two events, the 
extent to which monetary policy target and path surprises can explain the observed volatility is 
analysed.  
The paper contributes to the existing literature in two main aspects. First, a direct comparison of 
the US and euro area bond and stock market intraday volatility patterns following monetary 
policy decisions is novel. Second, this paper is the first to examine the influence that monetary 
policy target and path surprises exert on intraday financial market volatility patterns, conditional 
on whether monetary policy rates have been altered or not. 
The paper reaches three main findings. First, intraday US and euro area stock and bond market 
volatility strongly increases at the time of the release of monetary policy decisions, and is 
particularly pronounced for the US financial markets. Second, monetary policy target and path 
surprises by the ECB both significantly move the euro area financial markets, whereas path 
surprises by the Fed have on average a larger influence on US bond and stock market volatility 
compared with the target surprises. Third, the yield response sensitivity for the German bond 
markets following an ECB monetary policy target surprise is stronger on the occasions when the 
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asset price reactions in the US and in the euro area following monetary policy decisions still 
remains a puzzle. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents some background and 
related literature, while Section 3 discusses the data used. The bond and stock market volatility 
reactions in the euro area and the US following their respective economies’ monetary policy 
decisions are elaborated upon in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  Background and related literature 
Volatility of prices of financial assets such as stocks and bonds surrounding monetary policy 
decisions can be used to gauge the extent to which they contain “new news” for market 
participants that would lead them to revise their expectations about the future monetary policy 
path and/or the macroeconomic outlook. If a monetary policy decision causes market participants 
to revise their expectations, this should then be reflected in higher volatility of financial market 
prices compared with a period free of such an event.  
Several differences can be noted in both the frequency and magnitude of interest rate settings 
between the two central banks (see Table 1). First, the ECB conducts monetary policy decisions 
meetings more frequently compared with the Fed. Second, the Federal Reserve has, on average, 
changed the interest rate more often and by larger magnitudes than the ECB over recent years.  
Table 1. Fed and ECB monetary policy decisions 
Fed ECB
Total number of events: 54 118
of which the monetary policy stance was changed 32 16
No of increases, 25 bp 21 7
No of increases, 50 bp 1 2
No of reductions, 25 bp 4 3
No of reductions, 50 bp 6 4  
Note: In this study, for comparison, the data start in April 1999, as the ECB then began to release its monetary 
policy decisions at the regular time of 13:45 CET. All statistics exclude the 17 September 2001 observation. 
Unscheduled monetary policy meetings by the Federal Reserve are also excluded. 
Both the degree of predictability of monetary policy decisions and the influence the decisions 
exert on financial asset prices have been discussed in the literature. As regards the former, many 
papers have shown that US monetary policy decisions in general have been well anticipated 
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 (April 1999 – May 2006) Piazzesi (2005)). The same holds true for the euro area, where financial markets have also been 
able to foresee the ECB’s monetary policy decisions (see for instance Wilhelmsen and Zaghini 
(2005)). In addition, monetary policy communication plays a key role in enhancing short-term 
predictability by allowing the public to understand monetary policy decisions, a fact which has 
been confirmed in a number of studies by Ehrmann and Fratscher (2005a, 2005b and 2005c). 
A number of papers have also examined the impact monetary policy decisions exert on the level 
of financial asset prices. Applied to US data, Gürkaynak et al. (2005) and Wongswan (2006) find 
that the US stock and bond markets react significantly to news about the near-term level of 
monetary policy and to changes in expectations of the path of monetary policy. Similarly, for the 
euro area, Brand et al. (2006) suggest that revised ECB monetary policy expectations have a 
significant and sizeable impact on the level of medium to long-term interest rates in the euro 
area. 
Fewer studies have been conducted on volatility reactions surrounding monetary policy 
communications. Applied to the United States, Andersen et al. (2005) find a significant rise in 
US long-term bond yield volatility surrounding monetary policy decisions by the Fed. Similarly, 
Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2002) show that the volatility on euro area money market rates tends to 
be higher following Governing Council statements by the ECB. This paper fills a gap in the 
existing literature by conducting a direct comparison between the US and euro area bond and 
stock market intraday volatility pattern following monetary policy decisions.  
3.  Description of data used 
The data used to measure financial market reactions consist of intraday data on euro area and US 
bond and stock prices.  
Asset  Exchange 
EUREX 
Chicago Board of Trade 
EUREX 
S&P 500  index  Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
The data have been provided by TickData Inc. The dates and times of when the Fed’s monetary 
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 EURO STOXX 50 futures  
US bond futures  
German bond futures Piazzesi (2005).
1 The actual and expected outcome of the Fed’s interest rate decisions are taken 
from the Bloomberg survey. The dates and times for the ECB’s monetary policy decisions have 
been collected internally. With regards to market expectations for ECB monetary policy 
decisions, the expected outcome from the Reuters survey is used. 






















abs V    (1) 
where Pt is the five-minute prices of the four assets.
2  
Table 2 summarises the descriptive statistics for the four return series used in the paper. The 
sample mean of the asset returns are all small and, given the sample standard deviations, not 
statistically different from zero. The returns are obviously not normally distributed given the 
large magnitudes of the skewness and kurtosis statistics.  











Mean 0.0001  0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0003 
Standard  deviation  0.0258 0.0398 0.1252 0.1048 
Skewness -0.24 -0.30 -0.57 0.16 
Kurtosis  17.73 55.07 37.82 12.43 
Note: April 1999 to May 2006. The overnight returns are omitted when computing the descriptive statistics 
Volatility is normally not constant throughout a trading day, but tends to be higher at opening 
and closing hours than during the middle of a trading day. This feature has to be taken into 
account when gauging whether policy decisions by central banks induce elevated price 
fluctuations. Figures 1 A–D below show the average five-minute volatility during the trading 
days for the US and euro area bond and stock series.
3
                                                      
1   With the exception of the 2005 and 2006 decisions, which are taken from Bloomberg. 
2   As an alternative the squared return could also be used as a measure of realised intraday volatility. This measure does not 
however change the interpretations.  
3    Over the sample under consideration, the trading hours of the STOXX futures and the German Bund futures have not 
remained constant. The intraday volatility shown in Figures 1A and 1B is therefore calculated using only hours which have 
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February 2007Figure 1A: German intraday bond market volatility 
(April 1999 – May 2006, 8.00 – 19.00 Central 
European time zone) 
Figure  1B. Euro area intraday stock market 
volatility  (April 1999 – May 2006, 10.15 – 17.00 
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The German bond and euro area STOXX future contracts display a number of interesting 
intraday features. First, volatility in general tends to be higher at the opening and closing hours 
of the trading day. At opening hours, prices normally have to adjust to new information, which 
may induce heightened price fluctuations. Higher volatility close to the end of the trading day is 
probably linked to some investors closing their trading books to avoid having open positions 
overnight. Second, the two spikes – occurring at 14:30 and 16:00 (Central European time) - 
correspond to the release of several important US macro announcements, such as the Non-farm 
payroll, Producer Price Index, Retail Sales, Consumer Price Index, ISM and Consumer 
Confidence. In addition, at 14:30 on the first Thursday of each month, the ECB holds a press 
conference at which information about the considerations concerning the monetary policy 
decision is conveyed. Third, the level of intraday volatility is higher for the euro area stock 
markets compared to the German bond future markets, which is something that is also observed 
for much lower frequencies such as daily data. 
Figure 1C: US intraday bond market volatility 
(April 1999 – May 2006, 07.20 – 14.00 Central time 
zone) 
Figure 1D. US intraday stock market volatility 
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The US bond and stock markets show a broadly similar pattern to their European counterparts. 
These two assets are traded on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBT), and the spikes at 07:30 and 
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volatility. 
4.  Asset price reactions following monetary policy decisions by the ECB and 
the Fed 
The following three subsections examine financial market intraday volatility patterns 
surrounding monetary policy decisions by the ECB and the Fed. Target and path surprises 
implicitly embedded in the monetary policy decisions are computed. These surprises are used as 
explanatory variables to the observed intraday pattern. In Section 4.1 the general volatility 
pattern is analysed. Section 4.2 provides some tentative explanations for the observed 
discrepancy between asset price reaction in the US and in the euro area following monetary 
policy decisions. Section 4.3 regresses the general intraday volatility pattern on monetary target 
and path surprises. Section 4.4 evaluates if the volatility pattern in financial markets differs 
depending on if monetary policy rates have been altered or not.  
4.1  General intraday volatility pattern surrounding monetary policy decisions  
Figures 2 and 3 display the ratio between five-minute bond and stock market volatility 
surrounding monetary policy decisions by the Fed and the ECB respectively, and the average 
five-minute volatility on the same weekdays and the same times but on non-announcement days, 
thereby controlling for both intraday and ‘weekday’ effects. A ratio above one can be interpreted 
as the monetary policy decisions inducing “higher than normal” volatility. As regards the timing, 
the Fed’s interest rate decisions are usually released at 13:15, and the ECB’s interest rate 
decisions at 13:45 (both local times).  
It should be noted that the Fed’s interest decisions, are also accompanied by a statement in which 
the outlook for the future monetary policy stance is conveyed.
4 This implies that, particularly for 
the Federal Reserve, there are two potential sources of new information arising from the interest 
rate decisions, a target surprise and a path surprise. The target surprise can be defined as the 
degree to which market participants have been able to anticipate the actual monetary policy 
decisions. The path surprise instead measures to what degree market participants have revised 
the future expected monetary policy path following the actual decision and/or monetary policy 
statements.  
                                                      
4   The trading of the US 10-year Treasury future note closes at 14:00 Central Time, i.e. 45 minutes after the Fed’s interest rate 
decisions. To enable a consistent comparison between the US bond and stock markets, the volatility window spans between 
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separate times. Announcements of the actual outcome of monetary policy decisions are released 
at 13:45 local time. However, details about the economic and monetary analyses underlying each 
interest rate decision are instead conveyed in the Introductory Statement read by the ECB 
President 45 minutes later. In the figures below, the volatility pattern for the euro area bond and 
stock markets is therefore extended to include any financial market movements that take place 
surrounding the press conference as well.  
Figure 2: US and German bond market volatility 
ratio surrounding monetary policy decisions by the 
Fed and the ECB (April 1999 – May 2006). 
Figure 3. US and euro area stock market volatility 
ratio surrounding monetary policy decisions by the 
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Note: The volatility measures are calculated as the ratio between i) 
five-minute intraday volatility on the US and German long-term bond 
futures markets surrounding interest rate decisions by the Federal 
Reserve and the ECB, and ii) “normal volatility”, the latter 
computed as the average absolute returns on the same week-days 
and same times but on non-announcement days. Using one-sided t-
test, the filled dots implies that the ratio is significantly higher than 1 
and empty dots that the ratio cannot be deemed as exceeding 1.  
Note: The volatility measures are calculated as the ratio between i) 
five-minute intraday volatility on the US (S&P 500) and euro area 
(EURO STOXX) stock markets surrounding interest rate decisions by 
the Federal Reserve and the ECB and ii) “normal volatility”, the 
latter computed as the average absolute returns on the same week-
days and same times but on non-announcement days. Using one-
sided t-test, the filled dots implies that the ratio is significantly higher 
than 1 and empty dots that the ratio cannot be deemed as exceeding 
1. 
Four interesting features can be inferred from the two figures. First, monetary policy decisions 
on both sides of the Atlantic tend to induce significantly “higher than normal” volatility on their 
respective economies’ bond and stock markets. Second, this feature seems to be particularly 
pronounced for the US bond and stock markets following interest rate decisions by the Fed. 
Third, some volatility persistence can be observed, in particular for the US bond and stock 
markets, where “excess” volatility can be noted up to 40 minutes after the decisions have taken 
place. Fourth, in the euro area, the Introductory Statement read by the ECB President induces 
somewhat “higher than normal” volatility on the euro area bond market.  
Potentially, any interpretations on the basis of Figures 2 and 3 could be spurious if important 
macro announcements were systematically released on the same days and at the same times as 
the monetary policy decisions of the Federal Reserve and the ECB. To examine this in detail, 43 
US and euro area macro announcements were collected and tested to establish whether they were 
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5 The results of this examination suggested that none of the announcements under 
consideration occurred at the same time as the Federal Reserve decisions. The monetary policy 
decisions of the ECB coincided with the release of macro statistics on only two occasions, and 
both concerned the German CPI statistics released on 23 March 2001 and 26 April 2001. These 
two instances of concurrence should not, however, distort the interpretation, as previous 
announcement papers have found that the German CPI does not move the euro area financial 
markets in any significant way – see Andersson et al. (2006) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher 
The small number of macro releases occurring at the time of the monetary policy decisions 
suggests that the observed upsurge in volatility is prompted by from the actual decisions and 
does not reflect market reactions to macro news. In stark contrast, the ECB press conference is 
usually held at times of important US macro announcements – in particular, the weekly initial 
jobless claims – making the volatility ratio difficult to interpret.
6 An analysis of the ECB press 
conference is, however, outside the scope of this paper, which purely concentrates on market 
reaction to the actual decisions. 
The average reaction to asset prices shown in Figures 2 and 3 may not be static but rather 
changing over time. There are several reasons why price reaction can change over time. 
Andersson et al. (2006) suggest that policymakers can sometimes signal a preference for one or 
more macroeconomic indicators as input for their policy decisions. In addition, some 
macroeconomic releases may behave in an unusual manner at a certain point in the business 
cycle, which can in turn have an impact on monetary policy decisions. To check for potential 
time variation, yearly averages were computed. Appendix A shows the yearly volatility ratios for 
the five-minute periods immediately surrounding and 30 minutes ahead of the monetary policy 
decisions respectively. The yearly averages are broadly similar across the years, suggesting that 
the pattern shown in Figures 2 and 3 can be deemed a general feature. 
4.2  Why intraday asset price movements are stronger in the US than in the euro 
area - some tentative explanations 
The finding that there is a higher intraday asset price reaction in the US than in the euro area 
following their respective economies’ monetary policy decisions is, interesting, but somewhat 
                                                      
5   See Andersson et al. (2006), Table 1, where the 43 announcements are listed. 
6   Over the sample April 1999 to May 2006, the Initial Jobless Claims was released at 106 times within a 60 minute window 
surrounding the 14.30 Press Conference. Similarly the release of the Philadelphia Fed Index occurred five times, Durable 
Goods two times, Business Inventories three times, Retail Sales at 4 times, CPI at 2 times, Advanced GDP at 3 times, GDP 
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(2003).  puzzling. The three best possible explanations for this discrepancy are as follows. First, 
potentially “more” information becomes available during the release of Fed interest rate 
decisions. In this respect, even though the actual decisions by the Fed have been anticipated by 
the markets, heightened volatility could still arise given an unexpected change in the tone of the 
accompanying statement. An interesting example of this took place in January 2004 when the 
Fed, as expected, held the policy rate unchanged (at 1 percent) but at the same time significantly 
changed its wording in the statement following the decision. As the Wall Street Journal wrote in 
its market commentary column the day after the decision; “While investors had expected the 
Fed's decision to keep short-term interest rates on hold at 1%, the absence of the “considerable 
period” phrasing, used since August 2003 to describe how long the bank would keep rates low, 
caught market participants off guard […] Prices plummeted in the immediate aftermath of the 
Fed's decision and the yield on the 10-year note shot up to 4.26%”.  
Second, the announcement literature which examines the impact on financial prices surrounding 
important macro economic announcements, has in general found stronger asset price sensitivity 
to US news compared with euro area news, partly owing to the view that the US is currently 
perceived among investors as the main engine of global growth.
7
Third, related liquidity and volume issues cannot be excluded as potentially important factors 
behind the apparent differences in observed asset price volatility across the Atlantic. This in turn 
can be divided into two subcategories, where the first concerns uncertainty regarding the timing 
of the decisions, and the second the fact that data on volumes may reveal presence of differences 
of beliefs among traders. As regards the first subcategory, Flemming and Piazzesi (2005) suggest 
that some uncertainty exists about the exact release of the US monetary policy announcements, 
which in turn have an impact on intraday market pricing in the US Treasury markets. In 
particular, liquidity tends to be low if an announcement is released minutes later than the 
expected 13:15. This in turn can trigger higher price sensitivity when the actual announcements 
are released. In contrast, timing uncertainty for the ECB’s monetary policy decisions should not 
exist given the exact 13:45 release.  
For the second subcategory, a sharp increase in volume may reveal higher levels of differences 
in opinions among traders which in turn can results in higher financial market volatility, 
everything else held equal, see Harris and Raviv (1993). Empirical studies have found that 
trading volume increases at the time of macroeconomic announcements and monetary policy 
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sample under consideration. However, the number of transactions within a specified time 
interval should closely track the volume in the markets, according to the data provider. For the 
series used in this paper, this data type is available for the German bond markets, the euro area 
stock markets and the US bond markets. Figures 4 - 6 replicate the volatility ratio calculations 
above and display the ratio between the amount of transactions within five-minute intervals 
surrounding monetary policy decisions by the ECB and the Fed respectively, and the average 
five-minute transactions on the same weekdays and the same times but on non-announcement 
days.  
Figure 4: Volume approximation for the German 
bond markets surrounding monetary policy 
decisions by the ECB (April 1999 – May 2006). 
Figure 5: Volume approximation for the German 
stock markets surrounding monetary policy 
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Note: The volume approximations are calculated as the ratio 
between i) the number of transactions in the five-minute intervals for 
the German long-term bond futures markets surrounding interest 
rate decisions by the ECB, and ii) the number of transactions on the 
same days and same times but on non-announcement days. The 
intervals span 30 minutes before to 85 minutes after the decisions for 
the ECB. 
Note: The volume approximations are calculated as the ratio 
between i) the number of transactions in the five-minute intervals for 
the euro area (EURO STOXX) stock markets surrounding interest 
rate decisions by the ECB, and ii) the number of transactions on the 
same days and same times but on non-announcement days. The 
intervals span 30 minutes before to 85 minutes after the decisions for 
the ECB. 
The volume approximations for the German bond markets and the euro area stock markets reveal 
a similar picture and to some extent mimic the observed spikes in volatility shown in Figures 2 
and 3. Overall the number of transactions in the two markets on average is more than double at 
                                                      
8   See for instance Balduzzi et. al. (2001) applied on economic news and Flemming and Piazzesi (2005) applied on Fed’s 
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decisions.
8 Recently, Gropp and Kadareja (2006) test the hypothesis as to whether differences in 
opinions among traders can induce heightened intraday volatility, applied on European banks 
stock data. The annual report is used as a measure of the precision of the information available 
about banks. The authors find, in line with theory, that intraday volatility of the banks’ stocks 
following a monetary policy shock becomes larger the longer the lag is since the annual report 
was released.  the time of the ECB’s monetary policy decisions compared with the number of transactions 
during Thursdays where there is no ECB monetary policy meeting. 
A similar calculation was conducted for the US 
Treasury markets. The sample size is however 
shorter than for European assets above. The 
reason is that up until June 2003, only the 
number of so-called pit trades is available. 
From July 2003 and onwards the electronic 
trades were also included, making a 
comparison with the EUREX traded assets 
more accurate for this latter period. As seen in 
the figure, nearly ten times as many trades 
were conducted during the time of the Fed 
monetary policy decisions compared with the 
number of transactions during the same days but with no Fed monetary policy meeting.  
Figure 6: Volume approximation for the US bond 
markets surrounding monetary policy decisions by 
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Thus, it cannot be excluded that in the US markets, there are more investors with differences in 
opinions from the mean investor than in the euro area, which in turn may play a role in 
explaining the marked differences in intraday volatility. 
4.3  Evaluating the impact monetary policy surprises have on intraday financial 
market volatility 
All in all, it is reasonable to assume that the arrival of new information could heighten volatility 
surrounding monetary policy releases. To assess this in more detail, this and the next subsection 
will focus on the strong upturn observed at the time “0” in Figures 2 and 3, which corresponds to 
the realized asset price volatility immediately surrounding the monetary policy decisions by the 
Fed and the ECB respectively. The idea is to analyse to what extent the upswing in volatility can 
be explained by monetary policy surprises.  
Monetary policy surprises are divided into two types: target surprises and path surprises. A target 
surprise is defined as the degree to which market participants have been able to anticipate the 
actual monetary policy decisions, whereas a path surprise measures the degree to which market 
participants have revised the future expected monetary policy path following the actual decision 
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Note: The volume approximations are calculated as the ratio 
between i) the number of transactions in the five-minute intervals for 
the US bond markets surrounding interest rate decisions by the Fed, 
and ii) the number of transactions on the same days and same times 
but on non-announcement days. The intervals span 30 minutes before 
to 40 minutes after the decisions for the Fed. The target surprise can be derived from either available surveys or financial market prices. Both 
measures have their pros and cons. The main advantage of the former is that they in principle 
should contain the “true” mean expectations about upcoming future monetary policy decisions. 
On the other hand, financial market expectations benefit from the fact that they are available at a 
much higher frequency compared with survey-based measures. But, as shown by Piazzesi and 
Swanson (2004) and applied to US data, expectations derived from the financial markets could 
contain risk premia and market noise, which may blur the interpretation.  
This paper will make uses a survey-based measure for the target surprise which represents the 
difference between the actual outcomes and the mean of analysts’ expectations concerning the 
outcomes of the monetary policy decisions. This measure is chosen as the methodology used is 
identical for both the euro area and the US. As a cross-check, Appendix B shows the target 
surprise used in this paper compared with market-based measures employed in some earlier 
studies. Overall the two measures exhibit very similar patterns which are also confirmed by the 
estimated correlation coefficients of 0.75 for the ECB target surprises, and 0.8 for the Fed target 
surprises. Thus, the survey-based measure should therefore be a good indicator of the target 
surprise as perceived among investors.  
The path surprise component employed in this study is derived in line with Gürkaynak et. al. 
(2005): 
t t t t PS TS f + + = ∆ − * , 30 β α   (2) 
where ∆ft-30,t
months’ time surrounding the monetary policy decisions (Euribor and Eurodollar future contracts 
for the euro area and the US respectively). The TS represents the target surprise component as 
described above. The innovation from the regression in Equation (2) is defined as the path 
surprise (PS). Given that the purpose of this exercise is to examine the effects on financial 
markets surrounding the actual monetary policy decisions, potential information about future 
ECB monetary policy conveyed in the Introductory Statement at the ECB press conference is not 
included in the derived ECB path surprises. 
To evaluate how the changes in the volatility ratios surrounding the monetary policy decisions 
by the Fed and the ECB as shown in Figures 2 and 3 can be explained by the target and/or path 
surprises, the following regression set-up is used: 
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 represents the intraday changes in the expected three-month interest rate in six The Abs(TS) and Abs(PS) variables in eq. (3) correspond to the absolute values of the target and 
the path surprises respectively. The ∆Volratiot-30,t represents the difference between the observed 
volatility ratio in the period immediately surrounding the monetary policy decisions and the 
volatility ratio 30 minutes ahead of the decisions.
9 The choice of the intraday impact relative to 
that of non-announcement days as a dependent variable is in line with the procedure by 




Constant Abs(TS)  Abs(PS)  R
2 Corr(Abs(TS), 
Abs(PS))  




































Note: The regression specifications are: ∆Volratio-30, t = α1,t + β1*Abs(TS) + β2 *Abs(PS) + εt for the four asset 
classes respectively. ∆Volratio represents the changes in the volatility ratio (30 minutes before and five minutes 
after the monetary policy decisions) between observed volatility on monetary policy events and volatility on non-
announcement days. Abs(TS) and Abs(PS) correspond to the absolute values of the target and the path surprises 
respectively. Newey-West heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. One, two and three 
asterisks denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
Three notable features can be inferred. First, a monetary policy target surprise induces 
significantly higher than normal volatility in the German bond markets. Second, the ECB path 
surprises have a highly significant impact on the euro area stock markets. Third, in the US the 
results suggest that path surprises on average have a larger influence on the US bond and stock 
market volatility compared with target surprises.  
One potential problem with the Equation (3) regression specification could be presence of 
multicollinearity between the explanatory variables. However, the classic symptoms of 
multicollinearity, such as i) high R
2 and few significant t-ratios and ii) high pair-wise correlations 
                                                      
9    As Appendix C shows, the changes in the volatility ratios mostly hover in positive territory across the four markets. 
However, on a few occasions the observed volatility ratio is slightly lower at the time of the monetary policy decisions 
compared with the volatility ratio observed 30 minutes ahead of the announcements. A closer inspection of the data suggests 
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individual impact that the target and the path surprises have on financial market prices.  
4.4  Impact of monetary policy surprises on intraday financial market volatility, 
conditional on whether policy rates have been altered or not 
One possible source for the different reaction patterns between the two economies could be that 
the markets react differently depending on whether monetary policy rates are changed or not. In 
this regard, monetary policy moves usually take place when market uncertainty can be expected 
to be higher than normal, such as risks of very low inflation or outright deflation,
10 or when there 
is uncertainty regarding an expected future strengthening of economic activity.
11 Furthermore, 
some interest rate moves take place during extreme market conditions. One example was the 
joint interest rate reduction of 50 basis points by the ECB and the Fed in the aftermath of the 
September 11 terrorist attack. Using daily data, Wilhelmsen and Zaghini (2005) find less 
predictability – the latter measured as the standard deviation in money market rates – when a 
modification in the official policy rate is decided on, compared with days when the monetary 
policy authority does not change the official rate. This pattern holds true for all 14 economies 
included in their study. 
Appendix D decomposes the volatility pattern between monetary policy events when policy rates 
are adjusted, and when they remained unchanged. As seen in Figures D1 and D2, the elevated 
volatility, in euro area stock and bond markets during monetary policy announcements seems to 
be related to the periods when the ECB decided to change rates. In contrast, monetary policy 
decisions by the Fed induce elevated stock and bond market volatility independent of the 
outcome (see Figures D3 and D4).  
One possible explanation for the different pattern of behaviour across the two markets can be 
related to an asymmetry in the monetary policy surprises, i.e. that they are higher in magnitude 
when the ECB changes rates compared with no change events. Table 4 summarises the mean and 
the standard deviation of the surprises conditional on whether rates have been altered or not. 
Overall, the mean of the (absolute) surprises is somewhat higher in both economies (and for both 
                                                      
10   An example of this was the 25 basis point rate reduction by the Fed in June 2003. The accompanying statement justified the 
decision stating: “The Committee perceives that the upside and downside risks to the attainment of sustainable growth for the 
next few quarters are roughly equal. In contrast, the probability, though minor, of an unwelcome substantial fall in inflation 
exceeds that of a pickup in inflation from its already low level.” 
11   An example of this was the increase of 25 basis points by the ECB in December 2005. The accompanying introductory 
statement explained why: “On the basis of our regular economic and monetary analyses, we have decided to increase the key 
ECB interest rates by 25 basis points, after two and a half years of maintaining rates at historically low levels. Looking 
ahead, on the external side, ongoing growth in global demand should support euro area exports, while on the domestic side, 
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remained unchanged. However, the difference is particularly pronounced for the computed target 
surprise of the ECB, which could partly explain why asset price volatility in the euro area is 
higher when policy rates are adjusted compared with periods when policy rates are left 
unchanged.  
Table 4. Summary statistics of the monetary policy surprises, in basis points 
Target surprise Path surprise Target surprise Path surprise
Mean of the absolute surprises
Total sample 3.0 1.0 2.5 3.4
When rates were left unchanged 1.5 0.6 0.6 2.8
When rates were changed 13.0 1.4 4.0 4.0
Standard deviation of the absolute 
surprises
Total sample 5.6 1.4 5.6 3.2
When rates were left unchanged 3.2 0.5 1.0 2.6
When rates were changed 7.7 1.9 7.1 3.5
Fed ECB
 
To examine the asymmetric issue further, a slight modification of the regression set-up in 
Equation (3) is used: 
t t t t t DX X D Volratio ε β β α α + + + + = ∆ + − , 2 , 1 2 1 5 , 30  (4) 
where D is a dummy variable which takes on a value of 1 when interest rates are changed, and a 
value of 0 if they are unchanged. The matrix X corresponds to the independent variables (i.e. the 
absolute values of the target and path surprises). Equation (4) has the following implications: 
Mean volatility when D = 0 (i.e. monetary policy rates unchanged) 
X X D Volratio E 1 1 ) , 0 ( β α + = = ∆  (5) 
Mean volatility when D = 1 (i.e. monetary policy rates altered) 
X X D Volratio E ) ( ) ( ) , 1 ( 2 1 2 1 β β α α + + + = = ∆  (6) 
Four different possibilities can be tested using this set-up: 
1)  α1 = α2 and or β1 = β2; the two regressions are the same. 
2)  α1 ≠  α2 and or β1 = β2; the two regressions differ in the intercept. 
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February 20074)  α1 ≠  α2 and or β1 ≠  β2; the two regressions have different intercepts and different slopes. 
Thus, a significantly positive α2 coefficient suggests that volatility on average is higher when 
monetary policy rates are altered compared with periods when rates are left unchanged. In the 
same vein, a significant positive coefficient of β2 implies stronger asset price sensitivity when 
monetary policy rates are altered compared with periods when rates are left unchanged. Of 
particular interest is to test the significance of α2 and/or β2 for the German bond markets and the 
euro area stock markets. This could shed further light on the factors driving the elevated 
volatility following alterations of the ECB’s monetary policy rates, as shown in Appendix D. 
Table 5 outlines the results of the regressions after dropping the non-significant variables from 
Equation (3).  
The table reveals that asset price sensitivity is not linear for the German bond markets and the 
euro area stock markets. Instead, the volatility pattern is different depending on if policy rates 
have been altered or not. For the German bond market, the null-hypothesis of equal slope 
coefficient can be rejected at the five percent level. For the euro area stock markets the null-
hypothesis of equal slope coefficient can be also be rejected, but only at the ten percent level. As 
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Note: The regression specification follows the one specified in Equation (4) to test whether price sensitivity differs 
during periods when the central banks change policy rates. Newey-West heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors are in parentheses. One, two and three asterisks denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 
percent levels, respectively.  
Figures 7 and 8 visualise the differences in asset price pattern for the German bond market 
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Note: Details of how the bond volatility ratio 
(∆Volratiot-30,t) is calculated are shown in Appendix C. 
Note: Details of how the bond volatility ratio 
(∆Volratiot-30,t) is calculated are shown in Appendix C. 
The figures clearly show that intraday volatility tend to be of larger magnitude (see Figure 8) 
when interest rates are changed than when they are not changed (see Figure 7), even when the 
surprise are of the same magnitudes. Comments from the financial press after the interest rate 
decisions highlighted in Figure 8 seem to suggest that the interest rate decisions took the markets 
by surprise during these occasions (see Appendix E).   
5.  Concluding remarks 
Monetary policy decisions and the expected path of future policy rates strongly influence asset 
prices. Among the worlds’ leading central banks, monetary policy actions by the Federal Reserve 
and the ECB are particularly monitored among investors as they control short-term interest rates 
in the two major economies. This paper tries to shed some light on the link between monetary 
policy decisions and asset price reactions. Using long time series of intraday data, US and euro 
area bond and stock market intraday volatility patterns surrounding monetary policy decisions by 
the two central banks are derived. Overall both the ECB and the Fed decisions induce an upsurge 
in intraday volatility on their respective bond and stock markets. The reaction on US financial 
markets following the Fed’s decisions are more pronounced compared with the reaction the ECB 
exerts on the German bond markets and the euro area stock markets. Although this paper 
provides some tentative explanations that partly explain this discrepancy between the two 
markets, their decoupling patterns still remain a puzzle. 
As a next step, monetary policy target and path surprises are used as explanatory variables when 
explaining these upsurges in volatility. Monetary policy surprises are suitable candidates for this 
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Figure 7: Changes in German bond volatility ratio 
(y-axis)  and the ECB monetary policy target 
surprise (x-axis). Sample includes only observations 
when the ECB left monetary policy rates unchanged 
(April 1999 – May 2006) 
Figure 8. Changes in German bond volatility ratio 
(y-axis)  and the ECB monetary policy target 
surprise (x-axis). Sample includes only observations 
when the ECB altered monetary policy rates (April 
1999 – May 2006) policy target surprises by the ECB significantly induce higher than normal volatility in the 
German bond markets. In addition, path surprises by the Fed have on average a larger influence 
on US bond and stock market volatility compared with target surprises. 
When decomposing the asset price reaction based on whether monetary policy rates have been 
altered or not, the level of intraday volatility of the German bond markets and the euro area stock 
markets is found to be higher when interest rates are changed. This can probably be linked to two 
factors. First, monetary policy surprises are on average of a larger magnitude when the ECB 
decides to change rates compared with meetings which resulted in no change. Second, there is a 
non-linear asset volatility price sensitivity – which is particularly pronounced for the German 
bond markets - in that bond markets react significantly stronger to a given target surprise by the 
ECB when there has been a change in the official rate compared with periods when the policy 
rates have not been altered.  
Building on this study, a key direction for future research would be to find further evidence of 
factors that could explain the pronounced asset price reaction in the US financial markets 
following interest rate decisions by the Federal Reserve, compared with the more muted 




Working Paper Series No 726
February 2007References 
 
Andersen, T. G., Bollerslev, T., Diebold, F. X. and Vega, C., 2005, “Real-time price discovery 
in stock, bond and foreign exchange markets”, NBER Working Paper No. 11312 
 
Andersen, T. G., Bollerslev, T., Diebold, F. X. and Vega, C., 2003, “Micro effects of macro 
announcements: Real-time price discovery in foreign exchange”, American Economic Review, 
93, 38-62 
 
Andersson, M., Hansen, L. and Sebestyén S 2006, “Which news moves the euro area bond 
markets”, ECB Working Paper No 631 
 
Balduzzi, P., Elton, E. J. and Green, T., “Economic news and the yield curve: Evidence from the 
U.S. Treasury market”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 36, No 1, December 
2001 
 
Bernanke, B. and Kuttner, K., 2004, “What explains the stock market’s reaction to federal 
reserve policy?”, NBER Working Paper No 10402 
 
ECB monetary policy”, ECB Working Paper No 657 
 
ECB, 2001, “The monetary policy of the ECB” p 42 
 
ECB, 2006, Monthly Bulletin article, “The predictability of the ECB’s monetary policy”, 
published in the January 2006 issue 
 
Ederington, M. and Lee, J. H., 1993, “How markets process information: News releases and 
volatility”, Journal of Finance, Vol. XLVIII, No 4 
 
Ehrmann, M. and Fratzscher, M., 2003, “Interdependence between the euro area and the U.S.: 





Working Paper Series No 726
February 2007
Brand, C., Buncic D. and Turunen J., 2006, “Using money markets to construct an indicator of Ehrmann, M. and Fratzscher, M., 2005a, “Communication and decision-making by central bank 
committees: Different strategies, same effectiveness?”, forthcoming in Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking  
 
Ehrmann, M. and Fratzscher, M., 2005b, “How should central banks communicate?”, ECB 
Working Paper No 557 
 
Ehrmann, M. and Fratzscher, M., 2005c, “The timing of central bank communication”, ECB 
Working Paper No 565 
 
Flemming, M. and Piazzesi, M., 2005, “Monetary policy tick-by-tick” mimeo 2005 
 
Goldberg, L. and Leonard, L., 2003, “What moves sovereign bond markets? The effects of 
economic news on U.S. and German yields”, Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Vol. 9, 
No 9 
 
Gropp, R., and Kadareja, A., 2006, “Stale information, shocks and volatility”, ECB Working 
Paper No 686 
 
Gürkaynak, R., Sack, B. and Swanson, E., 2005, “Do actions speak louder than words? The 
response of asset prices to monetary policy actions and statements”, International Journal of 
Central Banking  
 
Harris, M., Artur R., 1993 “Differences of optionions make a horse race”, The Review of 
Financial Studies, Vol. 6, No 3 
 
Piazzesi, M. and Swanson, E., 2004, “Futures prices as risk-adjusted forecasts of monetary 
policy”, NBER Working Paper No 10547 
 
Thornton, D. L., 1998, “Tests of the market’s reaction to federal funds rate changes”, Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, November/December 
 
Wilhelmsen, B. R. and Zaghini, A., 2005, “Monetary policy predictability in the euro area: An 





Working Paper Series No 726
February 2007Wongswan, J., 2006, “The response of global equity indexes to U.S. monetary policy 




Working Paper Series No 726
February 2007Appendix A 
Yearly average volatility ratios surrounding monetary policy decisions  
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
MPD - 30 1.10 1.10 0.92 1.12 1.31 0.97 1.09 1.40
MPD 1.01 1.80 1.55 2.00 1.91 1.34 1.15 1.11
MPD - 30 0.84 1.05 0.46 0.45 0.69 0.73 1.11 0.49
MPD 7.53 2.22 3.45 2.51 4.00 5.64 5.57 6.05
MPD - 30 1.20 1.16 0.86 0.71 0.87 1.19 2.03 1.36
MPD 1.66 1.45 0.82 1.16 1.66 2.62 2.75 3.28
MPD - 30 0.74 0.69 0.50 0.52 0.83 0.45 0.36 0.76
MPD 7.22 3.13 3.51 1.56 0.90 2.21 1.75 2.29
German bond markets
US bond markets
Euro area stock markets
US stock markets
 
Note: The volatility measures are calculated as yearly averages of the ratio between i) five-minute intraday volatility on the US and euro area 
bond and stock markets surrounding interest rate decisions by the Federal Reserve and the ECB and ii) “normal volatility”, the latter computed 
as the average absolute returns on the same weekdays and same times but on non-announcement days. MPD corresponds to the volatility ratio 
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Figure B1. Market and survey-based target surprises 
in the monetary policy decisions by the ECB 
(November 2000 – April 2006)  
Figure B2. Market and survey-based target surprises 
in the monetary policy decisions by the Fed (February 





















Note: The market-based measure comes from Brand, Buncic and 
Turunen (2006) and represents the 30-minute changes in the 30 day 
maturity euro area interest rates surrounding the ECB monetary policy 
decisions (interest rates are filtered using 64 instruments; deposit rates, 
EONIA and EURIBOR swap rates). The survey-based measure 
represents the difference between the actual outcome of the monetary 
policy decisions and analysts’ mean expectations taken from the Reuters 
survey.   
Note: The market-based measure comes from Flemming and Piazzesi 
(2005) and represents the one-hour changes in fed fund futures 
contracts surrounding the Fed monetary policy decisions. The survey-
based measure represents the difference between the actual outcome of 
the monetary policy decisions and analysts’ mean expectations taken 
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The volatility measure used as the dependent variable in regressions (3) and (4) is defined as the 
ratio between volatility on monetary policy days and volatility on the same weekdays and hours 
but when no monetary policy decision are taking place. More specifically, let k = 1,2 … K be the 
days of monetary policy decisions and d = 1, 2 ….D be the same weekdays, but when no 


























































   
R represents the five-minute log-return.  
Figure C1. German bond markets. Changes in 
volatility ratio (April 1999 – May 2006)  
Figure C2. Euro area stock markets. Changes in 
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Figure C3. US bond markets. Changes in volatility 
ratio (April 1999 – May 2006) 
Figure C4. US stock markets. Changes in volatility 
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Figure D3. Volatility ratio on the US long-term bond 
futures markets surrounding interest rate changes 
and no interest rate changes by the Fed (30 minutes 
before to 40 minutes after the decisions) 
Figure D4. Volatility ratio on the US stock markets 
surrounding interest rate changes and no interest rate 
changes by the Fed (30 minutes before to 40 minutes 
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Figure D1. Volatility ratio on the German long-term 
bond futures markets surrounding interest rate 
changes and no interest rate changes by the ECB (30 
minutes before to 85 minutes after the decisions) 
Figure D2. Volatility ratio on the Euro area stock 
markets surrounding interest rate changes and no 
interest rate changes by the ECB (30 minutes before to 
85 minutes after the decisions) Appendix E 
Financial market comments after ECB monetary policy decisions 
Date Interest  rate 
move 
Target Surprise  Comment 
8  June  2000  +  50  bp  26.25  Financial Times 9 June 2000: ”The ECB rate rise 
demonstrated the bank is not afraid of making decisions 
that surprise the markets … Most investors expected 
rates to go up by 25 basis points and did not price in a 
50 basis points rise…German 10-year bund prices 
advanced despite the surprisingly aggressive rise in 
interest rates while the short-dated bonds sold off ”. 
10 May 2001  - 25 bp  -24  Financial Times 11 May 2001: “Interest rates fall across 
Europe…  Markets were stunned by the ECB's 0.25 
percentage point reduction in its main interest rate to 4.5 
per cent. It was the ECB's first cut for more than two 
years and caught investors unprepared”. 
5 October 2000  + 25 bp  18.75  Financial Times 6 October 2000: “The biggest surprise 
in the government bond markets yesterday was the 
European Central Bank’s decision to raise interest rates 
by 25 basis points to 4.75 per cent, with prices on 
government bonds falling in response... After the initial 
shock wore off, bond prices recovered”. 
6 March 2003  - 25 bp  12.5  Financial Times 7 March 2003: “Short-dated eurozone 
government bond prices recovered their early losses 
yesterday, despite the European Central Bank's decision 
to lower interest rates by a quarter rather than a half 
point. The ECB cut rates to 2.5 per cent, but comments 
by Wim Duisenberg, ECB president, suggested further 
easing was on the cards”. 
5  Dec  2002  -  50  bp  -9.6  Financial Times 6 December 2002: “European 
government bond trading was dominated yesterday by 
interest rate decisions, notably the European Central 
Bank's half-point cut to 2.75 per cent … Eurozone bonds 
initially rose on the ECB's announcement of its first 
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